

Submission to the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee study on implementing existing procedural and substantive human rights obligations of States in the context of preventing and combating corruption

Asset Recovery for Reparation through mutually reinforcing Anti-Corruption and Human Rights Frameworks

May 2026

I. Introduction

1. The Global Survivors Fund (GSF) submits this contribution to the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee's study on "implementing existing procedural and substantive human rights obligations of States in the context of preventing and combating corruption,"¹ responding to core questions 10, 11 and 13, and stakeholder and rights-holder questions 1, 4, 7, 8 and 9. It addresses victim recognition (Section III), corruption as a driver of conflict-related harm (Section IV), asset recovery and reparations (Section V), victim participation in asset return (Section VI), and coordination between UNCAC review and human rights mechanisms (Section VII).
2. GSF was established in 2019 by Dr Denis Mukwege and Nadia Murad, Nobel Peace Prize laureates 2018. Its mission is to enhance access to reparations for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence globally, and to ensure survivors receive comprehensive reparative measures addressing their urgent needs in the meantime. GSF's work is grounded in its unique co-creation model and survivor-centred approach². Whilst reparation is a right and priority for victims, reparations are frequently left unfunded. GSF therefore works on financing pathways for reparations, including domestic public finance, international financing, asset recovery and repurposing.

II. Executive Summary and Suggested Guidelines

3. This submission addresses a recurring gap in anti-corruption and asset recovery practice: victims of corruption-linked human rights violations are often not treated as rights-holders entitled to remedy and reparation. In conflict, post-conflict and fragile settings, survivors may not describe themselves as "victims of corruption," but they may have been harmed by systems in which corruption enables violence, repression, extortion, denial of services and impunity. The submission builds on OHCHR's Recommended Principles on Human Rights and Asset Recovery, which provide a practical framework for integrating human rights into asset recovery and return,

¹ Human Rights Council, *The negative impact of corruption on the enjoyment of human rights*, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/59/6, adopted 7 July 2025, paras. 7-8.

² GSF, 'Strategic Plan 2024-2030', https://www.globalsurvivorsfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Strategic_plan_24_30_web_DP.pdf

including access to effective remedy, accountable, transparent and participatory allocation of returned assets, and use of recovered assets to advance human rights³.

4. While anti-corruption and human rights frameworks are in theory complementary and mutually reinforcing⁴, the Advisory Committee's study can clarify how to strengthen such complementarity in practice. GSF invites the Advisory Committee to include the following guidelines in its study; a discussion on the basis for each guideline can be found in Sections III-VII below.

Guideline 1: Recognise the victim status of persons harmed by corruption-linked human rights violations and ensure their access to judicial and administrative reparations. States should consistently recognise victims of corruption-enabled human rights violations as rights-holders entitled to effective remedy and reparation, including through judicial and administrative pathways. Recognition of victim status should not be limited to persons who can prove direct financial loss or a narrow link to a specific corrupt transaction, particularly in conflict, post-conflict and mass violation settings.

Guideline 2: Assess corruption-linked harm to victims and survivors. States and Human Rights Council mechanisms should assess corruption in conflict, post-conflict and authoritarian settings by examining how corruption not only enables serious human rights violations but also how corruption weakens the services and institutions victims and survivors need to recover. Anti-corruption and asset recovery policy should not assess harm only by the value of the assets at issue, but by the human rights affected, the victims harmed, the barriers to recovery, and the remedies and reparations that recovered assets should support.

Guideline 3: Use recovered assets to finance reparations. States should allocate recovered assets to reparations where there is a sufficient nexus between the corrupt conduct, the responsible actor and the harm suffered by victims. States should not limit social reuse to infrastructure or general development projects. Where legally permissible, they should use recovered assets to finance full and effective reparation, including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition. In conflict, post-conflict and fragile settings, such use should also be understood as an investment in recovery, peacebuilding, social cohesion and institutional trust.

Guideline 4: Ensure meaningful victim participation and safeguards in asset return. States should meaningfully involve victims and survivors of corruption-linked human rights violations before making allocation decisions in asset recovery and return processes. They should require asset return agreements, reparations funds and related mechanisms to establish transparent allocation criteria, independent oversight, public reporting, audits, accessible complaints mechanisms, protection from reprisals, safeguards for confidentiality and safety, and measures to prevent re-corruption; these should all be implemented with a survivor-centred approach.

³ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Recommended Principles on Human Rights and Asset Recovery* (2022), Principles 1, 5, 6, 7 and 8; see also pp. 8-9.

⁴ Human Rights Council, Resolution 35/25, The negative impact of corruption on the enjoyment of human rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/35/25, 14 July 2017, preambular para. 7

Guideline 5: Strengthen coordination between anti-corruption and human rights mechanisms. OHCHR and UNODC should develop joint guidance on victim-centred asset recovery and return, including the use of recovered assets for reparations. States and UN mechanisms should cross-reference UNCAC implementation review findings with recommendations from the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), treaty bodies, Special Procedures and Human Rights Council investigative mechanisms, including on access to remedy and reparation and asset recovery as a financing pathway for reparations.

III. Guideline 1: Recognise the victim status of persons harmed by corruption-linked human rights violations and ensure their access to judicial and administrative reparations *response to stakeholder question 1*

5. GSF recommends that the Advisory Committee approach the question of victim standing and reparations in corruption-related cases broadly⁵. In practice, the victim of corruption is often treated as the State, the treasury or the public budget. However, a State-only approach can obscure the individual and collective harms suffered by persons whose rights were violated through corruption-enabled systems. This is particularly problematic in conflict and post-conflict contexts, where the same person may be both a victim of serious human rights violations and a victim of corruption-linked abuse. Anti-corruption and human rights frameworks should therefore be mutually reinforcing, so that victims are not excluded because the harm they suffered does not fit neatly within a single legal or policy category.
6. States should ensure that victims of corruption-linked human rights violations can access not only judicial⁶, but administrative reparations programmes. Administrative reparations can provide more accessible, survivor-centred and scalable pathways to compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and other reparative measures, particularly where violations are widespread and judicial proceedings are unlikely to reach all victims. Such programmes should use context-sensitive eligibility criteria, flexible evidentiary standards, confidential procedures, trauma-informed registration, accessible outreach and safeguards against discrimination and reprisals. Recognition of victim status should not depend on whether each victim can prove an individualised financial link to a specific corrupt transaction. In mass violation settings, such a threshold is unrealistic and exclusionary. It should be sufficient to establish a credible connection between the corruption-linked conduct and the harm suffered, including where corruption enabled, facilitated, concealed or aggravated the violations, or formed part of the wider system through which those violations occurred.

⁵ This approach is consistent with OHCHR's Recommended Principles, particularly Principle 6, which states that persons whose human rights have been violated as a result of corruption should have access to an effective remedy. It is also consistent with the Advisory Committee's 2015 recommendation that the impact of corruption on specific human rights should be analysed and that gaps in protection should be identified, including the question of compensation for damage.

⁶ OHCHR Principles state that, [i]n light of the challenges involved in establishing causal links between acts of corruption and damage suffered by victims, domestic civil procedure laws that broadly define victims of corruption and that allow for public interest litigation represent best practices in the context of asset recovery; however, access to reparation should not be limited to that which is ordered through successful litigation, particularly in conflict, post-conflict or mass violence contexts.

IV. Guideline 2: Assess corruption-linked harm to victims and survivors response to core question 11 and stakeholder question 4

7. This section focuses on corruption as a driver of conflict and on its impact on economic, social and cultural rights, building on the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee's 2015 report and subsequent Human Rights Council Resolutions⁷. In conflict, post-conflict and authoritarian settings, corruption can fuel the machinery through which violence and repression are sustained, and it then weakens the services and institutions that victims and survivors need to recover.
8. First, corruption can help sustain systems of abuse. A concrete example is highlighted in a report by GSF's partner organisation, the Association of Detainees and the Missing in Sednaya Prison. Their report, *They Took Everything: Confiscation of Detainees' Assets and Funds in Syria* documented that, since 2011, the Assad regime confiscated an estimated USD 1.5 billion in assets from detainees. At the same time as people were arbitrarily detained, forcibly disappeared, tortured and sexually violated, homes, savings and businesses were seized, and families paid bribes in attempts to secure the release of loved ones⁸. A further example is Sri Lanka. The International Truth and Justice Project has documented continuing disappearances, torture and sexual violence against Tamils between 2015 and 2022, including 130 detentions involving torture and 91 involving sexual torture⁹. Its report also records that, in most cases, detainees were informally released into the hands of family members after payments or extortion through intermediaries. These examples demonstrate that, in contexts of fragility and violence, corruption, repression and serious human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law must not be analysed in isolation from each other. For victims and survivors, the harms they suffer may include sexual violence, detention, extortion, loss of property, loss of livelihood, stigma, displacement, denial of care or exclusion from education or public services. These harms often form part of the same system, and it follows that the same funds linked to violations should be allocated to reparations for the most grievous harms suffered.
9. Second, in conflict, post-conflict and authoritarian settings, corruption weakens the services and institutions that victims and survivors depend on to recover and realise

⁷ See Human Rights Council Advisory Committee, *Final report of the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee on the issue of the negative impact of corruption on the enjoyment of human rights*, UN Doc. A/HRC/28/73, 5 January 2015, <https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/28/73>, paras. 26-33; Human Rights Council, Resolution 35/25, The negative impact of corruption on the enjoyment of human rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/35/25, 14 July 2017, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1301241> preambular para. 7, which respectively recognised that corruption can have a negative impact on the enjoyment of human rights and that anti-corruption and human rights strategies should be mutually reinforcing

⁸ Association of Detainees and the Missing in Sednaya Prison, *They Took Everything: Confiscation of Detainees' Assets and Funds in Syria* (March 2022), available at <https://www.admsp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/They-Took-Everything-Confiscation-of-detainees-assets-and-funds-in-Syria-EN.pdf> pp. 7-8; Global Survivors Fund, "If corruption fuels conflict, asset recovery must fund reparations," 23 December 2025 <https://www.globalsurvivorsfund.org/latest/articles/if-corruption-fuels-conflict-asset-recovery-must-fund-reparations/>.

⁹ International Truth and Justice Project, *Disappearance, Torture and Sexual Violence of Tamils 2015–2022/23* (2024), pp. 4–5, 31, documenting 123 Tamil victims, 139 detentions, 130 detentions involving torture, 91 involving sexual torture, and the informal release of detainees following family payments or extortion through intermediaries, available at https://itjpsl.com/assets/ITJP_torture_report-FINAL-2024.pdf, accessed 4 May 2026

their economic, social, and cultural rights¹⁰, including health care, psychosocial support, housing, education, documentation, social protection, legal assistance and livelihood support. For survivors of conflict-related sexual violence, this can deepen the consequences of the original violation: medical care may be unavailable or unaffordable¹¹; education and livelihoods may be interrupted; and stigma may be compounded by poverty and exclusion from services.

10. Human rights and victim impact assessments should therefore form part of anti-corruption and asset recovery policy. They should assess both how corruption enables serious violations, and how it weakens enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights which would support recovery. Such assessments should look beyond the value of assets and identify related harms for which recovered assets could be allocated, in order to finance remedy and reparation for victims.

V. Guideline 3: Use recovered assets to finance reparations *response to core question 10 and stakeholder question 8*

11. GSF submits that reparations should be recognised as an eligible use of recovered assets where there is a nexus between the corrupt conduct or wrongdoing, the responsible actor, and the harm suffered by victims. Asset recovery should therefore be considered as one possible financing pathway for reparations, alongside domestic public finance, international financing and other lawful sources. Asset recovery processes often focus on identifying assets and their amounts, establishing ownership, securing confiscation or return, and agreeing arrangements for management. However, where there is overlap between the corruption and the human rights harms suffered, the asset recovery process must answer a further question: how recovered assets can help repair the harms suffered by victims.
12. Emerging practice shows that recovered assets do not need to be treated as ordinary State revenue. In France, Law No. 2021-1031 of 4 August 2021¹² created a mechanism for the return of "*biens mal acquis*" funds as close as possible to the population of the foreign State concerned, through cooperation and development actions. In the European Union, Directive (EU) 2024/1260 on asset recovery and confiscation¹³ encourages Member States to allow confiscated property to be used for public interest

¹⁰ OHCHR, *Recommended Principles on Human Rights and Asset Recovery* (2022), available at https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/OHCHR-RecommendedPrinciplesHumanRightsAssetRecovery_0.pdf, Principle 1 and commentary, paras. 14-15; introduction, para. 3 note that corruption is linked to the diversion of public resources away from the fulfilment of human rights, including education and health care, and that asset recovery can form part of efforts to maximise resources for the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights.

¹¹ See, for example, Global Survivors Fund, *The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Study on the Status of and Opportunities for Reparations for Survivors of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence* (2024), pp. 25–27, 35–36, 52–53, available at: https://www.globalsurvivorsfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/GSFReportRDC_ENG_2024.pdf which highlights that many survivors of conflict-related sexual violence have to travel more than a day to see a doctor, that nearly half of victims wait one year or more to obtain medical care, and that less than 50% of raped women have access to health centres.

¹² Loi n° 2021-1031 du 4 août 2021 de programmation relative au développement solidaire et à la lutte contre les inégalités mondiales, JORF n° 0180, 5 August 2021, art. 2 and annexed report, available at: <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000043898536/>, accessed 2 May 2026

¹³ Directive (EU) 2024/1260 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on asset recovery and confiscation, OJ L, 2024/1260, 2 May 2024, arts. 19–20, available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1260/oj/eng>, accessed 2 May 2026.

or social purposes. These are important first steps: they show that legal systems are beginning to move beyond automatic absorption of recovered assets into general budgets. The next step is to ensure that this practice is applied in ways that recognise victims of corruption-linked human rights violations as rights-holders, including by enabling recovered assets to support reparations.

13. OHCHR's Recommended Principles on Human Rights and Asset Recovery provide the human rights framework for this approach, with Principle 8 linking allocation to human rights outcomes by providing that recovered assets should be used in a manner that contributes to the realisation of human rights. The commentary gives a concrete example: the Philippines Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013 directed recovered Marcos assets towards reparations for victims of human rights violations. The Gambia also provides a relevant, though imperfect, example. Following the Janneh Commission's findings of corruption, abuse of power, theft and economic crimes, the Government accepted recommendations to forfeit or confiscate and sell assets linked to former President Yahya Jammeh. In 2019, the Government paid 50 million dalasis into the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC) Victims Trust Fund from the proceeds of the sale of Jammeh's assets, stating that reparations for victims should be granted directly from his wealth and assets¹⁴. REDRESS's report, *Reparation Today, Not Tomorrow: Guidelines for Repurposing Russia-linked Assets to Finance Reparation for Victims of the War in Ukraine*, provides practical guidance for competent authorities managing Russia-linked assets, including the allocation of a portion of repurposed funds to survivor-centred reparations, supported by legal reforms, survivor-centred design, sequencing, appropriate channels and monitoring¹⁵. These examples and supporting research show that assets linked to corruption and serious abuse can, and should, be directed towards reparations.
14. Reparations are not only a right for those who have been harmed by corruption-linked human rights violations, but should also be understood as an investment in recovery, human capital, social cohesion and institutional trust. The reparative use of recovered assets can address the specific consequences suffered by victims, while also supporting wider recovery in conflict, post-conflict and fragile settings. For survivors of conflict-related sexual violence, this may include compensation, medical care, psychosocial support, livelihood assistance, education, housing support, legal aid, community reintegration, recognition, memorialisation and measures to reduce stigma. Recent

¹⁴ However, The Gambia example also illustrates why transparent management and oversight of recovered assets are necessary. Subsequent reporting on a National Assembly Special Select Committee inquiry found that the disposal of Jammeh's assets was "marred by irregularities," including fragmented institutional arrangements, poor documentation, serious lapses in inter-agency coordination, failure to comply with freezing orders, inadequate asset preservation and significant losses. See JusticeInfo.net, "Gambia's reparation gap and botched sale of ex-dictator's assets," 10 March 2026, available at: <https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/156213-gambia-reparation-gap-botched-sale-ex-dictator-assets.html>. See also Malagen, "Jammeh's U.S. Mansion Funds Are Ready. Victims May Get Far Less," 30 November 2025, available at: <https://malagen.org/investigations/the-big-story/jammehs-u-s-mansion-funds-are-ready-victims-may-get-far-less/>

¹⁵ REDRESS, *Reparation Today, Not Tomorrow: Guidelines for Repurposing Russia-linked Assets to Finance Reparation for Victims of the War in Ukraine* (March 2026), available at <https://redress.org/publication/reparation-today-not-tomorrow-guidelines-for-repurposing-russia-linked-assets-to-finance-reparation-for-victims-of-the-war-in-ukraine/> pp. 4-8.

Ukraine-focused cost-benefit analysis by FHI 360 and People in Need found that community-based psychosocial support can generate substantial economic benefits: its multi-year scenario estimated a benefit-cost ratio of 17.6 - meaning approximately US\$17.60 in benefits for every US\$1 invested - including through reduced unemployment, higher earnings, reduced absenteeism and presenteeism, lower future medical costs and reduced family care burdens¹⁶. This supports the broader point that reparative measures can help restore human capital and strengthen recovery.

VI. Guideline 4: Ensure meaningful victim participation and safeguards in asset return response to core question 10 and stakeholder question 8

15. Victim participation is recognised in principle, but remains underdeveloped in asset recovery practice. Existing standards and practice tend to provide for civil society consultation, transparency and monitoring of returned assets¹⁷. Some frameworks recognise that civil society should participate, and victims' organisations can help identify victims, identify harm and contribute to decisions on asset use¹⁸. However, they do not consistently require victims and survivors of corruption-enabled human rights abuses to shape allocation, governance, oversight and monitoring. This is a key implementation gap which the Advisory Committee should address. For survivors of corruption-enabled human rights violations such as conflict-related sexual violence, torture and enforced disappearance, the standard should be higher than late-stage consultation. The Special Rapporteur on torture has recommended that survivors, as rights-holders, "should not only be consulted but instead be considered as co-creators of all policies and laws that affect them"¹⁹. Applied to asset recovery, this means that survivors should be involved in shaping allocation criteria, governance arrangements, complaints procedures and monitoring frameworks where recovered assets may be used for reparations. In implementing such participatory approaches, the asset recovery and return processes would themselves have a reparative value to victims and

¹⁶ FHI 360 and People in Need, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Mental Health and Psychosocial Support and Economic Recovery in Ukraine: Executive Summary (25 June 2025), pp. 5–6, available at: <https://www.fhi360.org/resources/cost-benefit-analysis-of-mental-health-and-psychosocial-support-and-economic-recovery-in-ukraine/>, accessed 2 May 2026

¹⁷ Global Forum on Asset Recovery, GFAR Principles for Disposition and Transfer of Confiscated Stolen Assets in Corruption Cases (Washington, D.C., December 2017), Principles 4, 5, 8 and 10, available at: https://anticor.world/assets/upload/321_thegfarpinciples.pdf; HM Government, Framework for transparent and accountable asset return (13 January 2022), paras. 3, 22–23, available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/framework-for-transparent-and-accountable-asset-return/framework-for-transparent-and-accountable-asset-return>

¹⁸ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Recommended Principles on Human Rights and Asset Recovery (2022), Principle 7 and commentary, available at: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/OHCHR-RecommendedPrinciplesHumanRightsAssetRecovery_0.pdf; CIFAR, Civil Society Principles on the Role of Victims in Asset Recovery (1 October 2024), Principles 1–4 and 8–10, available at: <https://cifar.eu/what-is-asset-recovery/victims-principles/>

¹⁹ Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Alice Jill Edwards, Investigating, prosecuting and preventing wartime sexual torture, and providing rehabilitation to victims and survivors, UN Doc. A/79/181, 18 July 2024, para. 80(b), available at <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/213/72/pdf/n2421372.pdf>

survivors, and offer a sense of accountability and justice for the corruption-linked human rights violations that were committed.

16. The Advisory Committee should call for this guideline to be operationalised through asset return agreements, reparations funds, victim compensation funds, ring-fenced budget lines and any bodies responsible for allocating, overseeing or monitoring recovered assets. This should include, at a minimum, requirements for human rights and victim impact assessments before allocation decisions are made; clear legal authority for the use of recovered assets to finance reparations; survivor and civil society consultation before decisions are finalised; and meaningful survivor participation in advisory and oversight structures. The Advisory Committee should also recommend transparent eligibility and allocation criteria, additional independent oversight, public reporting, audits, accessible complaints mechanisms, protection from reprisals, survivor-centred monitoring, and safeguards against re-corruption or capture by abusive institutions.

VII. Guideline 5: Strengthen coordination between anti-corruption and human rights mechanisms *response to core question 13 and stakeholder questions 7 and 9*

17. Anti-corruption and human rights systems remain insufficiently connected²⁰. The Advisory Committee's study should identify practical ways to operationalise this important connection and coordination, including through the following measures.
18. OHCHR and UNODC should develop joint guidance on victim-centred asset recovery and return, including the use of recovered assets for reparations.
19. States and UN mechanisms should cross-reference UNCAC implementation review findings with recommendations from the UPR, treaty bodies, Special Procedures and Human Rights Council investigative mechanisms. This would allow States and UN bodies to identify common concerns relating to judicial independence, access to remedies, asset recovery, victim protection, civic space, whistle-blower protection, participation, economic and social rights, and reparations²¹.
20. The UPR should be used to review, on a State-by-State basis, whether asset return and recovered assets are being used to advance human rights and reparations.
21. Special Procedures and Human Rights Council investigative mechanisms should examine, where relevant, whether corruption, illicit financial flows, asset concealment, sanctions evasion, confiscation or extortion have enabled serious human rights violations, and whether recovered assets could lawfully support reparations. Human Rights Council investigative mechanisms and documentation efforts should not only focus on establishing violations, elements of crimes and the responsibility of perpetrators, but also on documenting harms, identifying victims and include the creation of victims' registries so that the right to reparation can be operationalised.

²⁰ Human Rights Council Advisory Committee, A/HRC/28/73, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/794127?v=pdf>, accessed 30 April 2026. This report recognised that the link between anti-corruption measures and human rights needed to be translated into concrete measures.

²¹ UNODC, Mechanism for the Review of Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption: Basic Documents (United Nations, 2011), available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/ReviewMechanism-BasicDocuments/Mechanism_for_the_Review_of_Implementation_-_Basic_Documents_-_E.pdf; UNODC, "Implementation Review Mechanism," available at: <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/implementation-review-mechanism.html>

VIII. Conclusion

22. GSF invites the Advisory Committee to clarify that anti-corruption and human rights frameworks should reinforce one another in practice, particularly in conflict, post-conflict and fragile settings. Victims of corruption-linked human rights violations should be recognised as rights-holders with access to effective remedy and reparation, including through judicial and administrative pathways. Anti-corruption and asset recovery policy should also assess corruption-linked harm more fully, by examining both how corruption sustains serious violations and how it weakens the services and institutions victims and survivors need to recover and realise their economic, social and cultural rights.
23. The Advisory Committee should also clarify that recovered assets should be used to finance reparations where corruption has motivated or facilitated human rights abuses, conflict and repression, and this should be recognised as an investment in recovery, human capital, social cohesion and institutional trust. Victims and survivors should participate meaningfully in decisions on allocation, governance, oversight and monitoring.
24. Finally, the Advisory Committee should encourage stronger coordination between anti-corruption and human rights mechanisms. OHCHR and UNODC should develop joint guidance on victim-centred asset recovery and return, and UNCAC implementation review should be cross-referenced with the UPR, treaty bodies, Special Procedures and Human Rights Council investigative mechanisms.